The Logic of Risk
 <i>Risk is in the subject </i>
 <i>Risk is in the subject </i>
  • © 2025 Pasquale Cirillo 0

Risk is in the subject

Ciao! Welcome.

Hi there, below you’ll find extra content for The Logic of Risk, my podcast on risk and probability, available on all major platforms.
A new episode is released every week.

Whenever an episode features images, videos, or reading suggestions, you’ll find everything you need right here.

Episodes 9 and 10

References

  • Bruno de Finetti (2017). Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment. Wiley.
  • Gerd Gigerenzer (2015). Risk Savvy: How to Make Good Decisions. Penguin Books.
  • Richard Jeffrey (2004). Subjective Probability: the Real Thing. Cambridge University Press.
  • Frank Ramsey (1926). Truth and Probability. Available here.
  • Leonard Savage (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Dover.
  • Nassim N. Taleb (2017). Skin in the game. Penguin Books.

Regarding Bruno de Finetti, I also suggest checking this great website: www.brunodefinetti.it

Episodes 7 and 8

References

  • Donald Gillies (2000). Varieties of Propensity. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51, 807-835. Available here.
  • Karl Popper (1953). The Propensity Interpretation of Probability. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10, 25-42. Available here.

Episodes 5 and 6

References

  • Donald A. Gillies (1973). An Objective Theory of Probability. Routledge.
  • John Venn (1888) The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition. Freely available here.
  • Richard von Mises (1981). Probability, Statistics, and Truth. Dover.

Episode 4

I think that the simple Wikipedia page on the classical definition of probability is a good starting point for those interested in going deeper into the analysis.

Episode 3

References

  • Edwin T. Jaynes (2003). Probability Theory: The Logic of Science. Cambridge University Press.
  • Nassim N. Taleb (2005). Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets. Random House.

Episode 2

This image shows the triplets, illustrating the hierarchy of harm when the nature of the event is fixed, while allowing severity, distribution, and timing to vary.

It is worth noting that describing HHH as "riskier" than HMH is somewhat of an oversimplification for the sake of clarity. A more precise term might be "worse," though this would require adopting an axiological perspective. For now, however, we will use this terminology for simplicity.

LdR_Episode2

You can find the pdf here.

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